



Director of
Central
Intelligence

Top Secret

25X1

National Intelligence Daily

Monday
19 April 1982

Top Secret

CPAS NID 82-0911X

19 April 1982

Copy 252

25X1


Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Contents




25X1

4 Zimbabwe: *Security Problems* 6



25X1

7 OPEC: *Oil Production Levels* 9




25X1

Special Analysis

14 West Germany: *Social Democratic Party Congress* 14



Top Secret



19 April 1982

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

(4)

ZIMBABWE: Security Problems

2 The government is confident that it can contain the threat of violence posed by supporters of Joshua Nkomo, but a military show-down with his dissident followers or the arrest of Nkomo could lead to large-scale disturbances. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

3 Former guerrillas of Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union are responsible for recent killings of policemen and acts of banditry. The government is concerned that they may attempt to disrupt ceremonies this week commemorating Zimbabwe's independence. [redacted]

25X1

3
2 Comment: Nkomo may not be personally responsible for the unrest, and some ZAPU officials are attempting to rein in their followers. If the dissidents are acting independently, the government will be hard pressed to end the violence. Military actions against ZAPU dissidents could result in clashes between Mugabe's and Nkomo's backers in the Army. [redacted]

25X1

1 Prime Minister Mugabe probably expects low-level violence to continue for some time. His appointment yesterday of additional ZAPU members to the cabinet evidently is intended to ease tension between the government and ZAPU and also to isolate Nkomo from his party. These steps, however, are not likely to diminish Nkomo's support within ZAPU, and the government risks increased violence if it arrests him. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

19 April 1982

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

⑦ OPEC: Oil Production Levels

OPEC countries as a group appear to be producing close to the organization's ceiling of 17.5 million barrels per day.

25X1

25X1

Nigeria is producing about 400,000 barrels per day below its quota despite OPEC efforts to put pressure on oil companies to increase purchases. The closure of the Iraq-Syria pipeline has forced a reduction in Iraqi output to almost 500,000 barrels per day below Baghdad's quota.

25X1

25X1

Comment: Continued production in excess of the established quotas by a few members will make it more difficult for output to recover in such financially pressed countries as Nigeria. Although Venezuela is likely to cut back to its assigned ceiling, Iran is likely to increase sales over the next several months to reach its desired production target of 2.3 million barrels per day. Total OPEC production probably will have to remain at current depressed levels at least through mid-year in order to reduce excess stocks held in consuming countries.

25X1

Top Secret

19 April 1982

25X1

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

14

WEST GERMANY: Social Democratic Party Congress

25X1

Chancellor Schmidt probably will fail in his attempts to use the Social Democratic Party congress in Munich this week to strengthen his government and to create an impression of greater party unity. Several delegates are likely to air frustrations with West German and US policies. Party leaders will make some concessions to anti-INF forces, but they expect to prevail in the voting on that and other key issues because the delegates realize that infighting could help the Christian Democrats regain power.

25X1

The party's national leadership is aware that difficult economic circumstances and deteriorating East-West relations have weakened their control over the delegates at this congress. Since returning to power in October 1980, the Social Democratic Party has suffered five consecutive setbacks in state and local elections, most recently last month in Lower Saxony.

25X1

State party organizations have criticized Schmidt's conservative economic policy and, in many instances, have openly defied his pro-NATO security policies. A growing number of party members and West German political observers believe that conditions will not improve soon, that the party could suffer other losses in state elections this year, and that it could well be out of power in Bonn before the end of 1984.

25X1

Delegates to the congress are aware that party factionalism is a major cause of the election losses and the tensions with their Free Democratic coalition partner. Nevertheless, many will be tempted to use the congress to vent their frustrations.

25X1

To prevent recriminations from being translated into formal resolutions that would further damage the party or undermine commitments to NATO, Schmidt and his colleagues will try to limit the debate over INF, nuclear

--continued

Top Secret

25X1

19 April 1982

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

power, economic policy, and the reasons for recent electoral losses. They will yield to leftists on other issues that are less critical to West Germany, such as the enhanced radiation warhead and developments in Central America, and put off a "final" decision on INF deployment until 1983. [redacted]

25X1

Security Issues

NATO's INF modernization decision will be at the center of the security policy debate. Schmidt last year threatened to resign if the party reversed its support for the decision. The executive committee's draft resolution for the congress reaffirms this support, welcomes the Geneva talks and urges that they should aim for the "zero option," and calls for a moratorium on the deployment of new shorter range missiles. [redacted]

25X1

14 The draft resolution is at odds with the US interpretation of the decision, however, by calling for a convention in the fall of 1983 to make a final party decision on deployment after evaluating progress made in Geneva. In addition, the resolution contradicts NATO's INF negotiating position by supporting inclusion of US forward-based systems, as well as British and French nuclear systems, in arms control talks. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Party leaders know that the US, the UK, and France will be particularly unhappy with the draft. They believe, nonetheless, that by using this tactic they will be in a better position to win party support for deployment next fall. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

--continued

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

19 April 1982

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

Hopes and Fears

Party leaders hope that the public will focus on the resolutions approved at the congress, helping to dispel the notion that the Social Democratic Party is paralyzed by factionalism. They believe that such a papering over of differences would enhance the party's prospects in the coming state elections, reduce any fears in the US about West Germany's reliability as an ally, and stiffen the Free Democratic Party's loyalty to the coalition.

25X1

These desires will be difficult to achieve if, as seems likely, the media highlight divisions in the party, as well as any speeches by party leftists that criticize Schmidt or the US. In any case, Free Democratic Party chief Genscher probably will not be reassured.

25X1

14 The congress is not likely to precipitate the government's fall because it probably will not provide Genscher sufficient justification to risk a coalition change. The left is unlikely to be so intransigent as to help bring the Christian Democrats to power.

25X1

Schmidt will point to the voting results in an effort to create the impression that a significant majority of the party supports his policies. Changes in the cabinet involving Social Democratic ministers are expected to follow the congress in order to reinforce the belief that Schmidt either has--or is determined--to overcome the disunities that have caused a loss of public confidence in his party and government over the past year.

25X1

Top Secret

19 April 1982

25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010175-2

25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010175-2